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NUCLEAR POWER AND LEGAL ADVOCACY. By Constance Ewing 
Cook. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books/ D.C. Heath. 1980. Pp. 
xvi, 155. $10.95. 
The conflict between increasing world demand for energy and 
public concern over nuclear plant safety has placed the nuclear 
power industry at a crossroads between expansion and extinction. 
The latter seems a real possibility, for during the entire two-year pe-
riod before the Three Mile Island nuclear accident, only one electric 
utility had placed an order for a nuclear power plant. According to 
Constance Ewing Cook of Albion College, several factors deter all 
but the most determined industrialists from building a nuclear plant. 
Labor and material costs have increased; technological and safety 
regulations have become more stringent; and interest-group opposi-
tion has increased. Professor Cook's study of the nuclear power in-
dustry's decline focuses on the anti-nuclear environmental groups' 
use of legal advocacy to stall the licensing process. 1 Cook takes 
neither a pro-industry nor an anti-nuclear stand on the merits of the 
controversy. Her purpose instead is to assess the strategic uses of the 
legal process by interest groups. Nuclear Power and Legal Advocacy 
shows how the losers in court, the anti-nuclear groups, have become 
the real winners. 
Cook first introduces the two combatants, the nuclear industry 
and the environmentalists, and traces the political phase of their 
struggle. She describes at length the groups with a stake in the future 
of the nuclear power industry - scientists, engineers, utilities, envi-
ronmentalists, and public interests groups. As the economic strength 
of the industry increased/ so did the political strength of its oppo-
nents. Cook concludes that the anti-nuclear groups beat the nuclear 
industry in the political forum. Their visible leadership used organi-
zational and political skill to mobilize public opposition, while the 
"fragmented" leadership of the nuclear industry failed to take ad-
vantage of all available political resources (p. 24). 
J. PoL. 727 (1979); Brakel, supra note l; Cohn, Book Review, 8 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 159 (1978-1979); Cronk, Book Review, 28 CATH. U. L. REV. 159 (1978); Linton, Book 
Review, 8 CONTEMP. Soc. 598 (1979). 
l. Legal advocacy has been prescribed as an interest group strategy by other authors. See 
J. PELTASON, FEDERAL COURTS IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS (1955); J. SAX, DEFENDING THE 
ENVIRONMENT (1970); C. VOSE, CAUCASIONS ONLY (1959); Orren, Standing lo Sue: Interest 
Group Co'!flict in the Federal Courts, 70 AM. PoL. Sci. REV. 723 (1976); Vose, Litigation as a 
Form ef Pressure Group Activity, 319 ANNALS AM. ACAD. PoL. & Soc. Sc1. 20 (1958). These 
works are cited by Cook. P. xiv. 
2. The share of the nation's electricity supplied by nuclear plants grew from less than five 
percent in 1973 to thirteen percent in 1978. P. 3. 
818 Michigan Law Review [Vol, 79:817 
Cook believes that, at least until recently, the environmentalists' 
exploitation of the legal process has been their most potent weapon. 
Before building any nuclear plants, the utilities have to obtain con-
struction and operating licenses from the federal administrative 
agencies.3 The federal licensing process affords opportunities for de-
lay by anti-nuclear advocates. "[O]nly . . . the environmental 
groups . . . have taken full advantage of their legal resources by fre-
quently intervening in regulatory hearings and then appealing the 
Commission's rulings to the courts for judicial review" (p. 107). 
Even though most court decisions have favored the nuclear indus-
try,4 this has not diminished the effectiveness of the strategy of delay. 
Such long delays, accompanied by substantial interim increases in 
construction costs and loss of revenue, have demoralized the nuclear 
industry. Largely as a result of the environmental groups' efforts, 
"the total time allotment for building and licensing a nuclear plant 
now ranges from twelve to fourteen years" (p. 32). 
Cook devotes the second half of the book to a case study of pro-
longed licensing of the Midland, Michigan nuclear plant. Cook out-
lines the battle over Midland, and guides the reader through the 
adminstrative licensing process, the administrative and judicial ap-
peals, and the United States Supreme Court's final resolution of the 
legal issues. Consumers Power Company first announced the Mid-
land project in December 1967; the Supreme Court's decision came 
in April 1978;5 the plant has yet to be completed as of mid-1980. 
The initial projected cost of $349 million had risen to $1.67 billion 
by 1976. The successful delaying tactics of the anti-nuclear attorney, 
Myron Cherry, caused one observer to conclude that "as Mr. Cherry 
loses battle after battle, he just may . . . be slowly winning the war" 
(p. 95). The environmentalists used various legal and political strat-
egies to affect the outcome of the litigation: they chose a liberal fo-
rum, the District of Columbia Circuit; they solicited amicus curiae 
briefs; and they promoted favorable media coverage and law review 
commentary. Cook concludes that although the choice of an activist 
forum favored the environmentalists at the circuit court level (p. 79), 
it ultimately served to increase the likelihood of Supreme Court re-
3. The Nuclear Regulatory Co=ission has been responsible for plant licensing since 
1974, when it replaced the Atomic Energy Co=ission. P. 5. 
4. See, e.g., Siegel v. Atomic Energy Commn., 400 F.2d 778 (D.C. Cir. 1968), One impor-
tant exception is Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Co=., Inc. v. United States Atomic Energy 
Commn., 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (environmental impact statement required for each 
proposed nuclear plant). 
5. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 
U.S. 519 (1978). 
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versal, because "the Court of Appeals ruling was at odds with the 
policy of judicial restraint which the Burger Court had been pre-
scribing for the lower courts" (p. 87). In the Midland case, the 
Supreme Court told the lower courts to leave the licensing process to 
the Commission (p. 96). 
Cook's decision to focus primarily on the environmentalists' use 
of legal advocacy blinds her to a consideration of larger systemic 
problems that have made the environmentalists' strategies successful. 
Much of her discussion of the extra-judicial tools of persuasion used 
by the anti-nuclear advocates in the Midland case, for example, 
seems rather pointless - first because the Supreme Court's resolu-
tion of the Midland case was influenced less by those extra-judicial 
tools than by the Court's conservative judicial philosophy, and sec-
ond because delay itself, whatever its reasons, is success for the envi-
ronmentalists. The environmentalists have succeeded in delaying 
plant licensing not because of specific strategic decisions, but because 
they exploited the illogical complexity of the licensing process. 
The book's greatest value may lie in the issues that it implicitly 
raises but does not answer. Cook should have paid more attention to 
Congress's failure to write a sensible licensing law, since that failure 
deserves credit for the procedural delay: an incoherent national en-
ergy policy has permitted licensing cases to stay in the courts for 
years. Conspicuously absent from the book is any discussion of 
Congress's or the Chief Executive's role; Cook merely notes that the 
Supreme Court has urged Congress to change the administrative 
process if it wants licensing reform (p. 99). While Congress and the 
President are searching for a national energy policy, the environ-
mentalists are writing it in the courts. The complexity and sophisti-
cation of nuclear technology, however, make the courts an uneasy 
arbiter of technological solutions. 
Despite the narrowness of Cook's approach, the book provides a 
good descriptive case study of anti-nuclear litigation. Legal advo-
cacy, as an interest group strategy, was particularly successful be-
cause of the absence of legislative guidance for the licensing 
agencies. Cook successfully highlights the abuse and weakness of a 
political and judicial system that can only resolve issues in favor of a 
combatant once it is already too bloodied to enjoy the spoils of its 
victory. 
